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NOTES
IN SEARCH OF AN ENFORCEABLE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY
AGREEMENT:  INTRODUCING
CONFIDENTIAL CONTRACTS AS A
SOLUTION TO THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP PROBLEM
MATTHEW J.B. LAWRENCE*
Scholars have argued that the malpractice system would be better off if patients had
the option of waiving the right to sue for malpractice in exchange for a lower fee.
Some doctors have tried to follow this advice by having their patients sign medical
malpractice exculpatory agreements, but courts usually have refused to enforce
these agreements, invoking a void-for-public-policy rationale.  This Note argues
that a doctor could maximize the odds that a court would enforce her medical mal-
practice exculpatory agreement by somehow ensuring that she will never find out
whether her patient decided to sign.  A case study of the law in New York highlights
the ambiguity in the void-for-public-policy rationale as to whether the simple fact
that the doctor-patient relationship is implicated in a medical malpractice contract
is fatal to enforcement, or whether such a contract could be enforced if it were
nonadhesive and clearly worded.  A behavioral-economic analysis of the patient’s
decision to sign a medical malpractice exculpatory agreement reveals a reason why
the agreements may be categorically barred:  Some patients might unwillingly agree
to sign for fear of signaling distrust or litigiousness to their doctors.  A confidential
contract—in which the offeror never knew whether the offeree had accepted or
not—would avoid this signaling effect.  A provider using such a contract could dis-
tinguish those cases in which the doctor-patient relationship alone seemed to justify
nonenforcement as not involving this prophylactic measure.
* Copyright © 2009 by Matthew J.B. Lawrence.  J.D. Candidate, 2009, New York Uni-
versity School of Law; B.A., 2006, Brown University.  A previous version of this Note was
the winner of the 2008 Barry Gold Memorial Health Law Writing Competition and was
published in the January 2009 New York State Bar Association Health Journal.  I am
deeply indebted to Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, who not only oversaw the devel-
opment of this topic from its infancy but patiently counseled me through countless research
proposals, fellowship applications, and publication drafts.  Professors Mark Geistfeld and
Sylvia Law guided this draft from its first stages into a Note, and the meticulous efforts of
Law Review editors, including Tom Clarke, Barry Gewolb, Drew Johnson-Skinner, Vadim
Novik, and Daniel Ricks, polished it into maturity.  I also wish to thank Professors Jennifer
Arlen, Rachel Barkow, Sam Issacharoff, and Barry Friedman, as well as participants in the
Furman Academic Scholars program, including Brian Burgess, Patrick Garlinger, and
Rebecca Stone.  Any and all errors remaining are my own.  Finally, I am grateful for the
constant support of Arminda Smith.
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INTRODUCTION
The rising cost of healthcare in the United States has prompted
many reform proposals pertaining to malpractice.1  One of the most
promising is the reform of medical malpractice rules to allow patients
to sacrifice their ability to bring malpractice suits against doctors in
exchange for lower fees.  If the cost of having the option to bring a
malpractice suit truly outweighs the benefit, patients will choose to
sign malpractice exculpatory agreements prior to treatment, con-
tracting out of the malpractice system and paying less for healthcare.2
Scholars of law and economics have long contemplated versions of
this proposal,3 although currently there is no uniform endorsement of
the idea.4
The actual enforceability of medical malpractice exculpatory
agreements is an unsettled question, however.  Courts treat general
exculpatory agreements—like those signed at amusement parks—as
they do any other contract, enforcing the contracts as long as they are
entered into voluntarily.5  But medical malpractice exculpatory agree-
1 Whether malpractice reform is actually needed is a subject of great debate.  Some
reports suggest that malpractice payouts are actually fairly small, and that high insurance
premiums are the result not just of payouts but also of the difficulty in pooling and pricing
malpractice risk. See SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT:  THE POLITICS OF
MALPRACTICE 170 (1978) (“[T]he timing and abruptness of the malpractice crisis were
generated more out of the economic insecurity of the industry as a whole rather than by
factors strictly related to malpractice.”); THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004 at 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf (finding that most claims were closed without compensation and
that fewer than ten percent of patient payouts were for $1 million or more). But see
Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical Malpractice System:  Structure and
Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11, 22
(William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006) (concluding that only forty cents of every
dollar paid in malpractice insurance premiums goes to patients); David M. Studdert,
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283,
286 (2004) (arguing that threat of malpractice lawsuits leads to administration of unneces-
sary procedures and avoidance of high-risk patients).
2 This argument has received a great deal of attention, especially among economists,
over the past three decades.  For an overview of the literature, provided in the context of
arguments against the desirability of exculpatory agreements as a policy matter, see
Jennifer Arlen, Contracting Over Malpractice Liability 2–3 nn.3–5 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105368,
and Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting:  Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 365 n.4 (1990).
3 An early example is Richard A. Epstein’s influential article Medical Malpractice:
The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976).
4 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 245, 246,
266 (using economic analysis to argue against exculpatory agreements).
5 See, e.g., Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., 748 F. Supp. 1011, 1026–28 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(awarding attorney’s fees as result of breach of covenant not to sue).
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ments have been repeatedly invalidated, often under the mysterious
“void-for-public-policy” rationale.6  If private medical malpractice
exculpatory agreements are not enforceable in court, this type of
reform will not be possible absent legislative intervention.7
In one symposium, Medical Malpractice:  Can the Private Sector
Find Relief? (“Private Malpractice Symposium”), several participating
scholars recommended ways to make medical malpractice exculpatory
agreements enforceable.8  They argued that courts would enforce such
agreements if they featured a few adjustments, noting that most agree-
ments challenged in courts so far have featured certain objectionable
traits,9 making it easy for courts to invalidate the contracts.  The sym-
posium authors argued that future agreements might be easier “for . . .
courts to swallow”10 if three conditions were satisfied.  First, the
agreements would have to be nonadhesive:  Patients would not be
required to sign to obtain medical service.  Second, they would have
to be specific and clearly worded, so as to actually inform the con-
sumer.  Third, they would have to be relatively narrow and only waive
either negligence (as opposed to gross negligence) or punitive
damages.11
6 Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Courts Disfavor Exculpatory Releases, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 6, 1998, at 3, 7 (describing validity of waivers in New York); see also A.M.
Swarthout, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contract Exempting Hospital or
Doctor from Liability for Negligence to Patient, 6 A.L.R.3d 704, § 2, at 705 (1966)
(describing validity of waivers generally).
7 The need for legislative intervention would undercut much of these proposals’
appeal. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES:  PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 303–10 (1995) (discussing need to persuade courts to
accept medical malpractice contracts); Eleanor Kinney, Health Care Choices:  Private Con-
tracts as Instruments of Health Reform, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 331, 337–38 (1996) (book
review) (exploring difficulty of enabling private reform through political process).
8 Symposium, Medical Malpractice:  Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 1, 143–320.
9 For example, some of the agreements have left patients without meaningful choices
or have been too broad.  See William H. Ginsburg et al., Contractual Revisions to Medical
Malpractice Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 254 (“[M]ost [excul-
patory agreements] were one-sided efforts by the healthcare provider to completely excul-
pate itself from tort liability.”); Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma:
Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143,
163–64 (noting that prior agreements reviewed by courts had made poor test cases).
10 Havighurst, supra note 9, at 165.
11 Ginsburg et al., supra note 9, at 255–57, 262–63; Havighurst, supra note 9, at 165–66;
see also HAVIGHURST, supra note 7, at 303–10 (outlining changes to contracts—notably,
greater information and menus of options—necessary to facilitate contracting over health-
care, including malpractice, and cautioning courts to enforce agreements).  The require-
ment that a patient have alternatives is not satisfied by a doctor’s claim that the patient
simply could have sought out a different doctor—as observers have pointed out, such an
arrangement still threatens choice when no local doctor will treat a patient who refuses to
sign. See Randy Cohen, Doctor, Bully, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 20
(“If a single physician were so skittish about malpractice suits . . . that she would see only
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This Note argues that the recommendations of the Private Mal-
practice Symposium scholars are helpful but incomplete.  While the
odds that an agreement will be enforced are undoubtedly increased if
it is nonadhesive, clearly worded, and narrow, I argue that a doctor or
patient who wants to maximize the chances that an agreement will be
enforced should find a way to make sure the patient’s choice to sign or
not sign remains confidential.
The legal analysis contained herein mainly focuses on New York
case law,12 which inconsistently applies the void-for-public-policy
rationale to medical malpractice exculpatory agreements.  In some
cases, New York courts have investigated the clarity and adhesiveness
of an agreement before invalidating it, a practice which bolsters the
symposium scholars’ argument that clear, nonadhesive agreements
could be enforced.  However, in other cases, the courts have categori-
cally barred agreements from being enforced once they have ascer-
tained that the exculpatory agreement restricts medical malpractice
claims.  It seems doubtful that the scholars’ recommendations could
save an agreement in these latter cases.  But it is not clear what aspect
of the doctor-patient relationship justifies nonenforcement in these
cases.  A behavioral law and economics–based analysis of a patient’s
decision as to whether to sign an exculpatory agreement highlights
one reason why the doctor-patient relationship may serve as a cate-
gorical bar.  A patient who refuses to sign an exculpatory agreement
may signal to her doctor both that she is willing to litigate and that she
believes there is a chance her doctor could perform negligently (or
worse).  Patients that are fairness-regarding—that is, those concerned
with appearing to be fair—are afraid to send these signals.  As I
explain in this Note, these patients may sign exculpatory agreements
due to the pressure resulting from this signaling effect.
The observation of this signaling-pressure barrier presents a pos-
sible new argument against the enforcement of these agreements.  But
the identification of signaling pressure surrounding the patient’s deci-
sion to sign an agreement could provide not just a sword to plaintiffs,
but also a shield to doctors arguing for the enforcement of these
agreements.  If the courts that apply the void-for-public-policy ratio-
nale to invalidate medical malpractice exculpatory agreements are
doing so because of the signaling pressure between doctor and patient,
patients who would forgo access to the courts, no problem . . . .  But if all, or nearly all,
doctors make the same demand, there’s nowhere else to go; a fundamental right is
eradicated.”).
12 While confining the discussion to only one state may seem limiting upon first glance,
a fifty-state survey is unmanageable, and attempts to gloss over the majority rule across
jurisdictions have failed to yield a clear picture. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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then they may not be as concerned if the doctor is unaware of her
patient’s decision.  A confidential exculpatory agreement would there-
fore be able to circumvent this barrier to enforcement.
Part I of this Note identifies the incongruous treatment of excul-
patory agreements by New York courts.  Part II performs a behavioral
analysis of the decision to sign a medical malpractice exculpatory
agreement and identifies a possible barrier to voluntary contracting
over malpractice:  Otherwise unwilling patients who are fairness-
regarding may sign exculpatory agreements to avoid the signaling
costs associated with saying “no.”  Part III argues that a confidential
exculpatory agreement that avoids the signaling pressure identified in
Part II would, at the very least, have a better chance of enforcement
than a similar agreement that was not entered into confidentially.
Part IV then explores the ways in which a medical malpractice excul-
patory agreement might be designed to assure the patient that her
decision to sign, or not, would remain confidential.
I
THE UNCERTAIN ENFORCEABILITY OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
Contracts are usually enforced if entered into voluntarily, but
sometimes an “overriding interest of society” justifies invalidating a
contract “on grounds of public policy.”13  While exculpatory agree-
ments in general are “disfavored,” they are typically enforced if found
to be voluntary.14  But medical malpractice exculpatory agreements
have often been found void as against public policy.15  Cases using the
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory note (1981) (“In gen-
eral, . . . courts will enforce . . . agreements without passing on their substance.  Sometimes,
however, a court will decide that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some
overriding interest of society and will refuse to enforce a promise or other term on grounds
of public policy.”).
14 E.g., Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (“Contractual
clauses which purport to exculpate a party from liability for his own negligence are disfa-
vored, and invite close judicial scrutiny.” (citing Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y.
1979))); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (App. Div. 1990) (“Our
analysis begins with the long-settled general proposition that the law frowns upon an
agreement intended to exculpate a party from the consequences of its own negligence and
requires that such contracts be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.”  (citing Gross, 400
N.E.2d 306)); see also Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 307–09 (holding that exculpatory agreement for
parachute school did not specify, and therefore did not cover, negligence, and setting
policy for exculpatory agreements generally); supra note 5 and accompanying text
(explaining general enforceability of exculpatory agreements).
15 As an oft-cited article explains:  “The application of [the void-for-public-policy test]
to exculpatory contracts between hospitals or physicians, on the one hand, and patients, on
the other, has been considered in relatively few instances. . . . [H]owever, . . . what rulings
there are indicate generally, but not uniformly, that contracts of the kind mentioned are
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void-for-public-policy rationale to invalidate medical malpractice
exculpatory agreements abound,16 while cases upholding the agree-
ments are difficult to find.17  However, it is unclear whether the resis-
tance to these agreements is a result of something that renders them
categorically void or, alternatively, of some quality of the subset of
agreements that are actually brought to court.  In the Private Malprac-
tice Symposium, the scholars noted that the agreements that have
been challenged in court have all been either vaguely worded or adhe-
sive, which made it easy for courts to conclude that the contracts were,
in fact, not entered into voluntarily.18  Thus, these agreements would
have been held unenforceable regardless of their medical treatment
issues; all things considered, they were simply poor test cases.19
There are no reported cases of a court confronting a medical mal-
practice exculpatory agreement of the sort suggested by the sympo-
sium scholars.  Thus, it is unclear whether a patient and provider
implementing solely the scholars’ suggestions would see their agree-
ment enforced.  I argue that while their recommendations are neces-
sary to having a medical malpractice exculpatory agreement enforced,
they are by no means sufficient.
invalid.”  Swarthout, supra note 6, § 2, at 705, cited in, e.g., Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 313;
Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 872 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
16 See, e.g., Rosenthal, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (refusing to enforce agreement); Creed v.
United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (App. Div. 1993) (same); Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 313
(same); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpub-
lished table decision) (same).
17 While these cases are difficult to find, they do exist, as the Ash court noted in its
opinion.  564 N.Y.S.2d at 309–10 (citing Morabito v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 481 N.Y.S.2d
936 (App. Div. 1984) (unpublished table decision); Black v. N.Y. Univ., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6,
1986, at 6 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (upholding exculpatory agreement since plaintiffs received
reduced fee for services and “parties were not in an inequitable bargaining position”);
Fearns v. Columbia Univ. Sch. of Dental and Oral Hygiene, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1979, at 10
(App. Div. June 2, 1978) (same)).
18 Ginsburg et al., supra note 9, at 253, 254; Havighurst, supra note 9, at 165–68.
“Adhesive” is not necessarily a synonym for “involuntary,” especially when substitutes are
readily available, but a contract’s adhesiveness can be a basis for invalidation, traditionally
under freedom-of-contract concerns. See generally Douglas A. Baird, The Boilerplate
Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (discussing court decisions striking down standard-
ized contract terms and arguing that generic attacks on boilerplate contracts as contracts of
adhesion ring hollow); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruc-
tion, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (arguing that form terms present in contracts of adhe-
sion should have rebuttable presumption of unenforceability).  This Note does not take a
position on this question.
19 See Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for:  Legal
Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at
159, 176 (noting that relevant case law contained “a highly polarized framing of the issues,
such as fully insured versus indigent patients or full liability versus complete waiver of
liability”).
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A. Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreements in New York
A case study is a valuable way to approach the enforceability of
voluntary medical malpractice exculpatory agreements.  Since these
agreements are governed by common law, each state jurisdiction
applies its own rule.  Attempts to sum up these cases across multiple
states have glossed over the doctrine and have failed to provide sub-
stantial clarification.20  As other scholars have recognized,21 New
York provides an excellent body of law for such a study.22  This is
especially true because, although there are no recently reported cases
in which New York courts have upheld an exculpatory agreement in
the healthcare context, some healthcare providers in New York
continue to use these agreements.23
20 Scholars that have touched on the commensurability of suggestions for contracting
around malpractice through a voluntary agreement with current doctrine have treated the
case law in only a general manner, if at all, recognizing that courts typically disfavor excul-
patory agreements in the healthcare context or discussing the majority rule in very general
terms. See, e.g., Ginsburg et al., supra note 9, at 253–55 (speaking generally about disfa-
vored status of contracts); Havighurst, supra note 9, at 144, 163–65 (stating that courts
have resisted recognizing exculpatory agreements but should stop doing so); Mehlman,
supra note 2, at 401–14 (broadly discussing confused state of law and arguing that it may be
understood in fiduciary terms).
21 See James Brock, Contractual Disclaimer and Limitation of Liability Under the Law
of New York, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1982) (analyzing enforceability of exculpatory
agreements generally through study of New York case law); A.M. Swarthout, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Contract Exempting Hospital or Doctor From Liability for
Negligence to Patient, 6 A.L.R.3d § 2, at 72–73 (Supp. 2008) (discussing seven cases, three
of which are from New York, in reviewing validity of exculpatory agreements under
majority rule).
22 First, New York is a large state that has a rich case law on the topic of exculpatory
agreements. See sources cited supra note 21.  Second, New York is representative of the
majority view found in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963). See Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (App. Div. 1990) (viewing
itself in “full agreement” with majority rule); see also Mehlman, supra note 2, at 401 (“The
landmark decision is Tunkl . . . .”).  Although Ash did not specifically refer to Tunkl as the
source of the majority rule, it relied on a lengthy quotation from the decision.  564
N.Y.S.2d at 312–13.  Third, as in other jurisdictions, courts in New York have generally, but
not uniformly, refused to enforce medical malpractice exculpatory agreements. Compare,
e.g., Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (invalidating exculpa-
tory agreement) with Morabito v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 481 N.Y.S.2d 936 (App. Div.
1984) (unpublished table decision) (upholding agreement).
23 For example, in Glazer v. Lee, 859 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (App. Div. 2008), the plaintiffs
lost a summary judgment motion on a separate issue, and thus the court never ruled on the
validity of the exculpatory agreement they had signed in their medical malpractice case.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19–20, Glazer, 859 N.Y.S.2d 250 (No. 2006-07768), 2007
WL 5232175 (arguing exculpatory provisions in agreement should be unenforceable); see
also Dunham v. City of New York, 766 N.Y.S.2d 854, 854 (App. Div. 2003) (declining to
rule on whether waiver of liability should have been void as matter of public policy); Poag
v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished table
decision) (holding exculpatory agreement for unorthodox cancer treatment was invalid).
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In New York, the void-for-public-policy rationale was first
applied against medical malpractice exculpatory agreements in Ash v.
New York University Dental Center.24  An exculpatory agreement
used by the New York University (NYU) Dental Center had been
invalidated in an earlier case because it did not mention negligence
specifically.25  The NYU Dental Center simply added a negligence
clause to its agreement,26 and the court was forced to confront a ques-
tion that prior courts had been able to avoid through strict interpreta-
tion:27  Could this properly worded agreement be enforced?  While a
prior New York Supreme Court case had found a release valid (and
was affirmed without opinion),28 the Ash court expressly declined to
follow that holding.29  It read the issue as one of first impression and
joined a growing majority of state courts in finding the exculpatory
agreement void as a matter of public policy.30  Specifically, the court
employed a two-pronged test, finding that the “special relationship”
between the doctor and the patient, along with the State’s interest in
the level of care received by its citizens, meant that the agreement
could not be upheld.31
The inclusion of these terms in contracts, even when such contracts are not enforceable,
could have implications on the patient’s decision to sue.
24 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (App. Div. 1990).
25 Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722, 724
(App. Div. 1985) (invalidating agreement because language was not specific).
26 Moore & Gaier, supra note 6, at 7 (describing history of Ash).
27 See Abramowitz, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (“[P]arties will not be presumed to have
intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the
absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect . . . .”); see also Schneider v.
Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that while New York allows exculpa-
tory agreements, they are strictly construed and particular agreement before court did not
clearly release defendants from future claims); DeVito v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 544
N.Y.S.2d 109, 109, 111 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that language was not clear enough to
exculpate negligence, as it did not say “negligence” or words of similar import, and noting
that those cases that upheld agreements involved “considerably stronger” language).
28 Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (App. Div. 1990) (citing
Morabito v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 481 N.Y.S.2d 936 (App. Div. 1984) (unpublished table
decision)).
29 Id. at 309–10.
30 Id. at 313 (“We are in full agreement with the foregoing conclusions and analyses
which are consistent with the majority view in this country that an exculpatory clause of the
type here in issue must be held invalid as a matter of public policy.”) (citation omitted); see
also, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441–42 (Cal. 1963) (finding
exculpatory agreement invalid because it “affects the public interest”); Clark v. Brooks,
377 A.2d 365, 374 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (finding that language of release did not bar
plaintiff’s claim against defendant); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. 1977)
(holding that exculpatory contract between patient and doctor was void based on public
policy grounds).
31 Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
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B. The Void-for-Public-Policy Test:  Categorical Rule or
Case-by-Case Analysis?
New York courts now cite Ash as the controlling case on medical
malpractice exculpatory agreements,32 but the courts applying the Ash
court’s void-for-public-policy holding have been unclear about
whether the Ash court created a categorical rule against the enforce-
ment of all such agreements or rather meant to limit its holding to a
particular type of agreement.33  Two post-Ash appellate cases in New
York, Rosenthal v. Bologna34 and Creed v. United Hospital,35 interpret
Ash as creating a categorical rule.  In Rosenthal, the First Depart-
ment,36 without a great deal of discussion, cited Ash in holding an
exculpatory agreement void because of “the State’s interest in the
health and welfare of its citizens, and also because of the highly
dependent (and thus unequal) relationship between patient and
health care provider.”37  In Creed, the Second Department did not
discuss the waiver it held invalid at all, solely stating that it agreed
“with our colleagues in the First Department [in Ash] that an agree-
ment such as the one upon which these affirmative defenses are
based[ ] violates public policy.”38  The Creed court’s one-sentence dis-
missal by citation to Ash strongly supports reading Ash as establishing
a categorical rule.
But there is also good reason to read Ash for the narrower
finding that a particular medical malpractice exculpatory agreement—
one that featured an absence of bargaining power, among other
things—would be invalid as a matter of public policy.  First, such a
reading is supported by Ash itself.  The court did not mention that it
was departing from previous cases, which might have been expected if
32 See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Ash
for rule); Creed v. United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (App. Div. 1993) (same); Poag v.
Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished table deci-
sion) (same).
33 Cf. Mehlman, supra note 2, at 401 (“[T]here is no consistency in the rationales
offered by the courts, little practical guidance for future cases, and no way to distinguish
cases that have invalidated such agreements as a matter of law from those that have upheld
them or permitted their validity to be decided by the jury.”).
34 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995).
35 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (App. Div. 1993).
36 Under the New York State court system, Appellate Division courts—those at the
intermediate appellate level—are divided into four geographical “departments.”  The First
Department, for example, deals with appeals from trial courts in Manhattan and the
Bronx, whereas the Second Department covers the other New York City boroughs, much
of Long Island, and several New York City suburbs.  New York State Unified Court
System, Appellate Divisions, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/appellatedivisions.shtml
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
37 Rosenthal, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
38 Creed, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
June 2009] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS 859
it were adopting a new rule that no longer followed a case-by-case
analysis.  More importantly, the court entered into an analysis of the
particular bargaining dynamics and implications of the agreement,
suggesting that the mere fact that the agreement dealt with malprac-
tice and was between provider and patient was not enough to render it
unenforceable.39  Additionally, the Ash court limited its holding to
“the instant case”40 and to exculpatory clauses “of the type here in
issue.”41
This interpretation is reflected in several post-Ash decisions.
Cases subsequent to Creed applying Ash have required more than a
simple finding that an agreement is between provider and patient and
concerns medical treatment to find it invalid.  For one, the court in
Rosenthal, while citing Ash, considered evidence that the plaintiff had
“entered the agreement . . . from a disadvantaged position” to be
important.42  In the recent case of Poag v. Atkins, the court stated that
these types of agreements are “typically”—but not always—invalid.43
While the court invalidated the agreement in that case, it also consid-
ered the same interpretive issues raised in the line of cases discussed
above.44  Other post-Ash decisions have engaged in a similar case-by-
case analysis.45
C. Possible Sources of the Categorical Rule
Determining whether New York has a categorical or case-by-case
rule is important because the former type of rule would presumably
invalidate even agreements that patients enter into voluntarily and
bargain for fairly.  This would create tension in the doctrine because it
would significantly depart from a separate line of cases that have sug-
gested that voluntary medical malpractice exculpatory agreements are
39 Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309–13 (App. Div. 1990).
40 Id. at 310.
41 Id. at 313.  It is unclear what “type” the Ash court was referring to—read broadly,
this line may appear to support a categorical rule against enforcement of medical malprac-
tice exculpatory agreements. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13–14, Dunham v. City
of New York, 766 N.Y.S.2d 854 (App. Div. 2003) (No. 2003-00146), 2003 WL 23321316
(arguing this exact point).
42 Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995).
43 Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpub-
lished table decision).
44 See id.  (“[T]he ‘agreement’ consists of several sentences in the middle of the
informed consent form signed by the plaintiff’s decedent; no separate heading or caption
was present to alert the decedent that she was foregoing the right to bring suit.  Thus, the
‘agreement’ is unenforceable.”) (citation omitted).
45 See, e.g., Dedely v. Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (Sup. Ct.
1994) (citing Ash for “a higher standard of responsibility” and finding contract was invalid
because it was signed by parent on behalf of minor).
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theoretically enforceable,46 and have engaged in an analysis of the lan-
guage and circumstances of each contract.47  Perhaps even more
troubling, such a rule would leave little room for those hoping to craft
an enforceable exculpatory agreement.
This Section explores possible explanations for why some courts
might have interpreted Ash as creating a categorical rule.  It argues,
by process of elimination, that the most likely source of such an inter-
pretation is the greater-responsibility justification of the void-for-
public-policy rationale.  The Ash court’s two-prong void-for-public-
policy rule focuses on:  (1) the public interest in the quality of health-
care being administered and (2) the “special relationship”48 that exists
between doctors and patients, which entails a “greater respon-
sibilit[y]” owed by doctors.49.  This section discusses each prong in
turn.
First, the public-interest-in-healthcare prong does not justify a
categorical rule.  This prong was the product of the court’s concern
that agreements allowing cheaper, reduced-quality care would lead to
“a de facto system in which the medical services received by the less
affluent are permitted to be governed by lesser minimal standards of
care and skill than that received by other segments of society.”50  But
exculpatory agreements need not affect quality to be value-adding in
46 See Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (App. Div. 1976) (“This is not to say,
however, that one may not, by agreement, relinquish a present right or claim or one which
subsequently accrues.”), remanded to Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct.
1979); Colton, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (“Does it include negligence and medical malpractice as
defendants claim?  Is it void in its entirety on public policy grounds, as plaintiffs claim?
These questions must both be answered in the negative.”).
47 See supra note 23 (providing several such decisions).  A number of other cases have
similarly refused to read a release as having exculpated negligence without very specific—
and centrally placed—language.  These courts require that agreements be not only “clear
and unambiguous on [their] face but also . . . understandable to the particular patient.”
DeVito v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 544 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (citing
Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div.
1985)).
48 See supra text accompanying note 31.
49 Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (App. Div. 1990).
50 Id.  The dental clinic in Ash was no ordinary hospital or clinic, but rather a teaching
clinic where the students were not “sufficiently prepared and supervised so that the treat-
ment which is provided to human patients is at least at the minimally acceptable reason-
able level of skill and care.” Id.  The court implied that the negligence waiver would result
in reduced-quality care for the less affluent:  “It is clear that the State’s substantial interest
in protecting the welfare of all of its citizens, irrespective of economic status, extends to
ensuring that they be provided with health care in a safe and professional manner.” Id. at
310; see also id. at 311 (noting patients may tolerate longer wait times, fewer amenities, or
other inconveniences in exchange for reduced-cost care, but that “[t]here cannot . . . be any
justification for a policy which sanctions an agreement which negates the minimal stan-
dards of professional care which have been carefully forged by State regulations and
imposed by law”).
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healthcare, and they certainly need not affect the quality of care for
the less affluent.51  Even assuming that the malpractice system plays
the role it is traditionally thought to in ensuring quality, to the extent
that “quality” is not a treatment-by-treatment decision and at least
some patients choose to retain the possibility of suing for malpractice,
an incentive for the doctor to meet the malpractice standard
remains.52  Furthermore, informed patients might refuse to sign con-
tracts that negatively affect quality.53
The second prong of the Ash rule draws upon concerns that
healthcare providers could abuse their “special relationship” with
their patients.54  The Ash court gave two different justifications for the
special-relationship prong.  At the time Ash was written, a prominent
contracts treatise—speaking of the use of “special relationships” to
invalidate exculpatory agreements generally—explained that there
were multiple “bases for deciding that a bargain, otherwise valid,
which exempts one from future liability to another that would arise
except for the bargain is invalid because the parties are in a certain
relationship to each other.”55  One basis was that “a relation often
represents a situation in which the parties have not equal bargaining
51 See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 6 (1991) (arguing physi-
cians view malpractice judgments as accidents—not as evidence of quality); Richard A.
Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious Liability, ERISA Pre-
emption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 642 (2001) (claiming malpractice lia-
bility is essentially random); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499,
1500–02, 1504 (1991) (reviewing WEILER, supra) (noting that very small fraction of those
harmed by malpractice actually bring suit); Lori L. Darling, Note, The Applicability of
Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice Insurance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 255, 259–62
(1987) (arguing malpractice premiums are not connected to quality). But see Jennifer
Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care
Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1940 n.36 (2003) (arguing Weiler study’s sample
size was too small to draw statistically significant conclusion that malpractice liability is
random).
52 See, e.g., LAW & POLAN, supra note 1, at 18–19, 61–62, 251–52 nn.18–19 (claiming
quality of healthcare outcomes is largely influenced by unnecessary treatment); Mark R.
Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in the Use of Health
Care Services?, 258 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2533, 2536 (1987) (arguing that seventeen to thirty-
two percent of studied procedures were unnecessary).
53 Indeed, it seems unlikely that patients would willingly sign contracts that give them
reduced-quality care if they had the meaningful option of paying for the higher-quality
care, since “[p]atients generally want high quality at reduced costs, not cut rates with fewer
protections.”  Sylvia A. Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 305, 317.  Even if a voluntary exculpatory agreement did
affect quality, the Ash court’s concern was with a departure from the minimal standard of
care for less affluent patients who could not afford otherwise, Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 311,
and a doctor might provide evidence that the patient had the financial wherewithal to pay
the higher fee and not sign.
54 Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 310–11.
55 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1751 (3d ed. 1972).
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power; and one of them must either accept what is offered or be
deprived of the advantages of the relation.”56  But a second and
independent basis was that “some relationships are such that once
entered upon they involve a status requiring of one party greater
responsibility than that required of the ordinary person, and, there-
fore, a provision avoiding liability is peculiarly obnoxious.”57  The
court in Ash did not commit to either of these justifications for the
special-relationship prong it employed, though it did address both.58
The “bargaining power” justification is relatively straightforward
and does not suggest a categorical rule.  Rather, the Ash court made
clear that the contract involved was adhesive59 (the patient either had
to sign or seek treatment from a different provider), which is a tradi-
tional ground for invalidating contracts on a case-by-case basis.60
The greater-responsibility justification, however, is the more
likely source of a categorical rule against the enforcement of medical
malpractice exculpatory agreements.  Read literally, the justification
applies if the parties to the exculpatory agreement consist of a pro-
vider and a patient to whom the provider owes a “greater responsi-
bility” than that owed to a non-patient.  Ostensibly, this greater
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The court seemed to base its holding on both justifications.  The court explicitly
states that the “greater responsibility” of the doctor in the patient-provider relationship is
a concern, citing WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 55, for this proposition. Ash, 564
N.Y.S.2d at 311.  But the court turns to the “bargaining power” justification after providing
the following inconclusive justifications:  “In the context of that professional relationship ‘a
provision avoiding liability is peculiarly obnoxious.’  Also significant in evaluating the pro-
vision’s validity are the unequal positions of the parties entering into this agreement, cre-
ating a substantial opportunity for abuse.” Id. (quoting WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note
55, § 1751).
59 The Ash court’s analysis of why the special relationship justified nonenforcement
makes this clear:  “[T]he individual responsibility bestowed upon defendants by the
physician-patient relationship, in the context of the disadvantageous position from which
plaintiff necessarily entered into the agreement, militates strongly against its propriety.” Id.
at 312 (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the court in Ash used the adhesive nature of the
contract to distinguish the case law upholding voluntary exculpatory agreements, stating
that:  “‘[The clinic’s patients] must either accept what is offered or be deprived of the
advantages of the relation’ . . . .  [They] cannot be considered to have freely bargained for a
sub-standard level of care in exchange for a financial savings.” Id. at 311–12 (quoting
WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 55, § 1751).
60 Thus, courts have compared healthcare services to those of other services invalidated
under this prong, such as common carriers or public utilities—industries in which the pro-
vider effectively has a monopoly and might impose the contract on the consumer even
when it is not in the consumer’s best interest. See DeVito v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry,
544 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (“In these relationships, the consumer’s need for the
service creates an inequality in bargaining strength which enables the purveyor to insist
upon a release, generally on its own prepared form, as a condition to providing the
service.”).
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responsibility is a necessary element of every patient-provider rela-
tionship.  It is important to note that the Ash court does not explain
why one party owing the other a greater responsibility might under-
mine a contract.  Thus, there is no underlying purpose that could be
used to guide application of the greater-responsibility justification on
a case-by-case basis.  Instead, it seems like a categorical rule.
If courts applying Ash as a categorical rule base this finding on
the greater-responsibility justification, the next step for a doctor
hoping to craft an enforceable medical malpractice exculpatory agree-
ment is unclear.  An agreement incorporating the suggestions of the
Private Malpractice Symposium scholars could meet both the public-
interest-in-healthcare prong and the bargaining-power justification for
the special-relationship prong of the void-for-public-policy rationale
because the contract need not affect quality and would not be adhe-
sive.  But courts have not articulated the reason why the “greater
responsibility” owed by doctors to patients justifies invalidation of
medical malpractice exculpatory agreements.  Without a more specific
articulation, there is no obvious way to craft an agreement that could
avoid a broad reading of the greater-responsibility justification and
the Creed line of cases.  The next Part puts forward a reason why the
greater responsibility doctors owe to patients justifies invalidation of
some agreements, but not all.
II
HOW SIGNALING EFFECTS CAN ENCUMBER THE DECISION
TO SIGN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT
This Part uses a behavioral law and economics analysis of the
patient’s decision to sign a medical malpractice exculpatory agree-
ment to show why the simple presence of the doctor-patient relation-
ship might justify invalidation of the agreement.  Behavioral economic
analysis is largely theoretical:  It uses as a starting point the economic
model of the purely rational, self-interest-maximizing decisionmaker
and qualifies that model with the insights of behavioral psychology.
First, a caveat:  Behavioral economic analysis is not the only way
to illuminate patient decisionmaking.  If it were possible, a case study
or survey of patients or doctors actually involved in the decisions
would be preferable as a replacement for, or supplement to, theoret-
ical analysis.  In cases like this, however, in which few examples of
medical malpractice exculpatory agreements that could be used for
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surveys or interviews exist,61 a methodology with predictive force is
necessary.  Thankfully, behavioral economic analysis provides that
methodology, as it is designed to be a generalizable theory of micro-
level decisionmaking.62
The analysis in this Part, however, is not purely theoretical.  It
incorporates studies of the doctor-patient relationship generally to
show that a behavioral economic analysis can describe actual decision-
making that occurs within this relationship.  It also provides some evi-
dence—anecdotal and otherwise—of how patients react when
presented with medical malpractice exculpatory agreements.
The following Section shows that, in contracting over malpractice,
a patient inevitably signals to her provider both her view of her pro-
vider’s competence and her willingness to litigate.  If this signal
amounts to a cost, then it could influence the patient’s decision to
sign.  Section B explains that, in general, signaling effects such as
those posed by medical malpractice exculpatory agreements can be a
cost to patients, for a variety of reasons both selfish and selfless.  Thus,
the analysis predicts (and some evidence corroborates) that, for many
patients, signaling pressure is a cost that undermines the voluntariness
of such agreements—even if they are nonadhesive and well crafted.
A. Exculpatory Agreements and Their Signals
Whenever an actor’s choice of behavior gives private information
to observers, that choice of behavior is said to have a signaling
effect.63  In accepting or rejecting her healthcare provider’s offer of an
61 A survey of patients might probe their opinions of medical malpractice exculpatory
agreements.  Because very few agreements have been used, however, the best available
sample would consist of prospective patients.  Such a sample could provide, at most, a
glimpse of how the patients think they would feel when presented with a medical malprac-
tice exculpatory agreement. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey
Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 256–60 (Fed. Judicial
Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) (noting surveys of “consumer impressions have a limited ability to
answer questions about the origins of those impressions” and outlining proper use of con-
trol groups in survey conduction).
62 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 636–37 (1999) (noting that
behavioral qualifications to rational choice theory are systematic and able to be modeled);
Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor:  A Behavioral Insight into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2000) (arguing that behavioral economics
can improve law and economic analysis “across the board”). But see Gregory Mitchell,
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1909–13 (2002) (arguing that behavioral
law and economics scholars, including Hanson and Kysar, make “incorrect and simplistic
conclusions about human rationality” and fail to see their field’s limitations).
63 For example, one explanation for the observed status quo bias in contract law—the
failure of actors to contract around apparently inefficient default contract terms—is that
the decision to negotiate away from a contract term itself sometimes signals information
June 2009] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS 865
exculpatory agreement waiving negligence, a patient inevitably signals
two things:  her perception of her doctor’s competence and her will-
ingness to litigate if she is harmed.  This is a fairly straightforward
signaling effect.  A patient who does not sign a negligence waiver is
effectively saying, “I believe there is a significant chance that you will
negligently commit an error in treating me for which I will seek and
receive compensation, and the value of that prospective compensation
outweighs the savings you have offered.”  The same is true of exculpa-
tory agreements waiving punitive damages, except instead of signaling
her perception of the likelihood of doctor error, the patient signals her
perception of the likelihood of reprehensible behavior by the doctor.
The core of the theoretical argument in favor of medical malprac-
tice exculpatory agreements is a standard freedom-of-contract argu-
ment:  Because patients enter into agreements with their doctors to
purchase medical services, the price of those medical services will
inevitably include the estimated cost of any future liability imposed on
either party by the law.64  When the malpractice regime is mandatory
(when exculpatory agreements are not enforced), the healthcare pro-
vider’s fee will always include the provider’s expected liability.  If,
however, the patient values the availability of a malpractice claim at
less than its cost to the provider, then forcing the parties to include an
undesirable contract term reduces the surplus created by the contract
and can even discourage contracting altogether at the margins.  Thus,
if courts allow parties to contract around the system, overall surplus
increases.  This Note does not purport to settle the debate about the
efficiency (or inefficiency65) of medical malpractice exculpatory agree-
ments; its primary focus is on the legality of these agreements.66
that is in some way costly to the actor.  Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 657–59 (2006).
64 Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Principle Versus Legislative Fixes:  Coming to Clo-
sure on the Unending Travails of Medical Malpractice, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 507 (2005).
65 See generally Arlen, supra note 2, for a thorough argument explaining ways in which
allowing medical malpractice exculpatory agreements would be harmful to some patients
and create inefficiency.
66 To the extent that the analysis herein contributes to the efficiency debate, it does so
simply by identifying an additional cost of enforcing medical malpractice exculpatory
agreements (the signaling pressure discussed in this Part) and proposes a potential solution
that avoids these costs in some cases (the confidential contracts discussed in Part IV).  The
proposed solution, however, would not entirely cure all the inefficiencies created by con-
tracting over liability.  For example, if patients are heterogeneous in the risk of malpractice
suit they pose (either because they are more likely to be harmed or because they are more
likely to sue), only the riskiest patients will purchase the malpractice option, creating a
problem of adverse selection. See Arlen, supra note 2, at 57 (discussing adverse selection
created by medical malpractice exculpatory agreements); see also Mark Geistfeld, Note,
Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1057, 1067–68 (discussing similar adverse selection problem in context of separate war-
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A hypothetical can help illustrate the unavoidable signaling
effect:  If a healthcare provider offers an exculpatory agreement along
with a fee reduction of $200 and the patient rejects it, the doctor then
knows that the patient values her right to sue for malpractice at
greater than $200.  A perfectly rational patient calculates the expected
value of malpractice availability by multiplying her estimated
probability of recovery by her estimated recovery amount; her rejec-
tion of the fee decrease shows that the product of these two estimates
is more than $200.  Thus, the patient thinks there is a significant
chance that her provider will negligently cause her significant harm,
and that she would successfully seek compensation for such harm.67
This signaling effect is complicated—but not eliminated or necessarily
diminished—by risk-averse patients68 and the availability of
insurance.69
ranty pricing).  Moreover, confidential contracting will not cure the inefficiencies of con-
tracting arising from the fact that malpractice liability can be a collective good. See Arlen,
supra note 4, at 247 (“Patients may benefit less from contractual liability than from tort
liability because patients governed by malpractice liability do not benefit simply from lia-
bility imposed for their own injuries.”).  For more on the efficiency implications of the
argument in this Note, see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
67 Pricing the right to malpractice is a difficult task.  For one approach to the applica-
tion of option pricing theory to legal rights, see generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW:
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
68 Risk-averse patients are those patients who would prefer a 100% chance of losing
$100 to a 10% chance of losing $1000. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258–69 (2004) (discussing risk aversion and accident costs).  Risk
aversion would simply affect the hypothetical in the form of a multiplier on the expected
award received through litigation (thus, rather than weigh the reduced price against the full
benefits of a tort award, the patient would weigh the reduced price against some fraction of
the benefits of a tort award).  This would not change the fact that the patient must both
foresee a significant chance of harm and be willing to litigate in order for the expected
award to be relevant to her signing decision.
69 The dynamics of the choice to sign a medical malpractice exculpatory agreement for
an insured patient are slightly different than for an uninsured patient—the insured patient
has both more and less incentive to sign the agreement.  An insured patient has more
incentive to sign because she would not be able to collect that portion of the tort award
that went to medical treatment even if she retained the malpractice right—insurance com-
panies usually claim a subrogation interest equal to the amount they have paid as a result
of the plaintiff’s harm. See generally Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited
Subrogation:  Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers To Take
Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (2007) (discussing subrogation).  However, an insured
patient has less incentive to sign because if the insurance company pays a large percentage
of the medical fee, it would see most of the resulting savings.  Although a full analysis of
the pricing dynamics under insurance is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be noted
that insurance alters—but does not eliminate—the patient’s cost-benefit calculus.  Accord-
ingly, the signaling effect remains.  Insured doctors retain an incentive to offer exculpatory
agreements because claims against doctors lead to higher insurance premiums.  Thomas H.
Gallagher & Wendy Levinson, Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients:  A Time for
Professional Action, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1819, 1819 (2005).  Insurance compa-
nies may even request that doctors offer such agreements.  Finally, for the forty-seven mil-
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B. The Costs of Signaling
The fact that a patient who signs an exculpatory agreement inevi-
tably signals something about her perception of her provider’s compe-
tence (or, in the case of punitive damages, morality) and her
willingness to litigate is interesting but not itself significant to the
enforceability of the agreement.  This signaling effect only becomes
significant when it is viewed as a signaling cost to the patient—when
the patient is afraid of revealing her perception of her provider’s com-
petence and acts accordingly.  Only then does the presence of a sig-
naling effect pressure the patient to sign and undermine the
voluntariness, and therefore the enforceability, of the agreement.
The key question then becomes:  Would a patient’s decision to
sign a medical malpractice exculpatory agreement actually be influ-
enced by the signaling effect described in the previous section?  Given
how rare exculpatory agreements are in practice, it is difficult to
obtain empirical evidence about the decisions of patients entering into
these agreements.
This Section argues that patient decisionmaking would, in fact, be
affected.  It does this first by presenting a theoretical model of deci-
sionmaking that is designed to describe behavior across contexts.  It
then shows that this model aptly describes the decisions of patients in
the patient-provider relationship, making the circumstantial case that
it would also describe the patient’s decision to sign an exculpatory
agreement.  Finally, it presents some direct evidence.
1. Fairness Costs in Theory
In behavioral law and economics, “fairness” describes the experi-
mentally observed behavior of actors who seem to consider the needs
of others in making a decision70 or retaliate against those who do
not.71  Fairness-regarding behavior was first observed in an experi-
lion patients without health insurance and for patients receiving elective surgery not
covered by insurance, this effect would be irrelevant. See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Govern-
ance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 58 n.297 (2008) (dis-
cussing number of uninsured Americans).
70 See Todd L. Cherry, Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, Hardnose the Dictator, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 1218, 1218 (2002) (attempting to devise game in which people would not
treat others fairly); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding
Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 653–54 (1996) (arguing that fairness-
regarding behavior depends on process and “social distance”).
71 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 297, 298 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004)
(“The results demonstrate the special role of ‘mutual-max’ outcomes (in which, given the
other person’s behavior, each person maximizes the other’s material payoffs) and ‘mutual-
min’ outcomes (in which, given the other person’s behavior, each person minimizes the
other’s material payoffs).”); see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
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mental study known as the ultimatum game, in which researchers
noticed that people went out of their way both to treat others fairly
and to retaliate against those they perceived to be unfair.72  The fact
that some people consider fairness in making decisions can induce
fairness-regarding behavior even in individuals who do not otherwise
value fairness.  Such individuals, acting strategically, try to appear fair
in order to avoid retaliation.73  For both fairness-regarding actors and
those behaving strategically, the “cost” of not acting fairly (for the
former, a personal preference; for the latter, a cost measured by risk
of retaliation) can be described as a “fairness cost.”
While the concept of fairness-regarding behavior seems rather
intuitive, the suggestion that actors purposefully consider the needs
and opinions of others challenges and qualifies the traditional eco-
nomic notion that individual actors consider only their own utility
when making a decision.74  It is important to recognize how fairness-
regarding behavior alters the economic, self-interested model because
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1562–63 (1998) (discussing possible
explanations for retaliation behavior).
72 This simple game involves two subjects:  a Proposer and a Responder.  The Proposer
is given some amount of money (researchers have conducted tests with amounts ranging
from very small to very large) and told to offer the Responder some portion of that money.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 289, 299 (1996) (finding results of ultimatum game did
not change with higher stakes).  If the Responder accepts, they both get the allocated
amount.  If the Responder does not, neither gets any money.  Hoffman et al., supra note
70, at 653.  In a world of perfect self-interest, the Proposer would be expected to offer the
bare minimum, knowing that the Responder would rather have even a very small amount
than nothing.  But this is not what individuals do when playing the game:  Instead, Pro-
posers offer closer to 50% of the total, and Responders reject extremely low proposals (in
apparent retaliation). E.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489–90 (1998) (reporting
contrast between results of ultimatum game and predictions of economic theory).  This
means not only that Responders would rather punish a Proposer they view as treating
them unfairly than take money but also that Proposers are aware of this and tailor their
proposals accordingly.
73 Richard Posner describes this dynamic as follows:
To gain anything from playing the game, the proposer has to make an offer
generous enough to induce the respondent to accept.  As this necessity exists
whether or not the proposer has any sense of fairness, there is nothing even
remotely irrational—hence nothing that requires a concept of fairness to
explain—about his offering more than a penny.  So we can forget about the
proposer and concentrate on the respondent, and ask, “Why won’t he take the
penny?”
Posner, supra note 71, at 1564.
74 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics and
the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1216 & n.20 (2003)
(“Some research in behavioral economics has focused on how people’s preferences are not
what economists had supposed.  For instance . . . people seem to have social preferences
that cause them to care about more than merely maximizing their own material payoffs.”).
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it can help to explain patient decisionmaking.  Unsurprisingly, studies
on fairness in the real world have documented behavior comporting
with the predictions of fairness-regarding behavior theories.75
The biggest difficulty in attempting to find fairness-regarding
behavior in practice is determining what is “fair” and what is “unfair.”
While this is a complicated and difficult question, for purposes of this
Note it is enough to say that behavior is “unfair” if the actor believes
the behavior represents a departure from the ideal norm of activity.
This definition comports with that used by other scholars in similar
studies.76
Fairness costs (or benefits) that attach to an action often depend
not on the action itself but rather on what the actor’s choice signals.77
75 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:  Entitle-
ments in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 728–29 (1986) (finding fairness costs con-
strained profit-maximizing firms).  A number of studies show that businesses often present
standard-form contracts to individuals in situations where social pressure will prevent them
from reading them, such as when they are in the front of a long line at the car rental booth,
so as to increase the likelihood that they will sign an entirely unfair contract. See Robert
A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 448 (2002) (describing use of this tactic).
76 See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Ultimatums, Dictators and
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216–17 (1995) (“The perceived norms of fairness . . . can
be thought of as rules of polite business practice.”).  It is true that this definition seems
largely circular—something is unfair if people think it is unfair.  Still, it at least suggests
that what is fair can be gleaned from people’s behavior (that is to say, fairness is socially
constructed), which provides some basis for identifying fairness in practice.  It is also the
best definition available.  In any event, the exact source or form of the fairness cost is less
important than its expressive function, as discussed in Part II.A.
77 One study presented the dictator game (like the ultimatum game, except that the
Responder has no power to reject the distribution) under double-blind conditions,
ensuring that neither the opposing player nor the researchers would know what division
the actor chose.  Under these conditions, 64% of players gave nothing, and only 8% gave
something approaching a “fair” price.  Hoffman et al., supra note 70, at 653–54.  In con-
trast, in a control group under the same study that was not double blind, only 18% gave
nothing, and 32% gave a “fair” price. Id. at 654. This has been confirmed by others
repeating the experiments. See, e.g., Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in
Anonymous Dictator Games, 16 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 181, 186–88 (1996) (presenting
results and noting inability to reject hypothesis that results of authors’ study and Hoffman
et al. study have same distribution); see also Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Expressed
Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games, 53 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 151, 154
(2005) (explaining that in two-player ultimatum game, second players are more likely to
accept extremely low offer if they know that allocation of money was randomly assigned
and not result of first player’s self-interested decision).  In short, “[p]eople are less con-
cerned with fairness than with the appearance of fairness.”  John R. Hibbing & John R.
Alford, Accepting Authoritative Decisions:  Humans as Wary Cooperators, 48 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 62, 64 (2004); see also Sally Blount, When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair:  The Effect of
Causal Attributions on Preferences, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 131, 131–32 (1995) (arguing that attribution matters to fairness concerns);
Camerer & Thaler, supra note 76, at 212 (“[T]he appearance of fairness is enough . . . .”);
Gary Charness, Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market, 22 J. LAB.
ECON. 665, 666 (2004) (finding employees worked harder when low wage was exogenously
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This can be true whether the actor experiences fairness costs because
he is fairness-regarding or merely because he is acting strategically.78
When fairness costs take the form of signaling costs, fairness-
regarding actors are concerned with the decisions that underlie their
actions and what those underlying decisions signal about the actor to
others.
The fact that fairness costs can be a function of signaling and not
the underlying behavior itself makes it possible to avoid these costs by
making the underlying decisions confidential.  But confidentiality is a
solution to the fairness problem only if a given patient’s fairness con-
cern arises from her discomfort with signaling to her doctor that she
wants to sue.  Confidentiality alone will not solve the fairness problem
if a patient’s sense of unfairness arises instead from her discomfort
with voluntarily seeking the right to sue, whether or not her doctor
knew she withheld the option.  In such a case, the patient would still
experience the distress of guilt even after signing a confidential con-
tract.  In this situation, there is an argument for taking the choice out
of the patient’s hands.79  Confidentiality does redress problems arising
from patients’ concerns with appearing to be unfair or untrusting to
their physicians, however.  This is because when fairness costs depend
on signaling, the “cost” of choosing to withhold the malpractice option
is annulled by making the decision confidential.
2. Fairness Costs in Patient-Provider Relationships
The theoretical model of fairness costs that has been developed
through laboratory experiments also aptly explains the patient-
provider relationship.  If patients are frequently fairness-regarding,
such behavior might be at play in deciding whether or not to sign a
medical malpractice exculpatory agreement.
Despite the difficulty in finding hard evidence of fairness-
regarding behavior in the doctor-patient relationship, there are exam-
ples of patients making decisions they would rather not make simply
determined than when it was chosen by employer); Rabin, supra note 71, at 297–98 (noting
that respect for “fairness” is actually dependent on motives of others).
78 In the strategic case, retaliation has not been observed in games in which the
Responder does not perceive the Proposer’s action as intentional:  It is the attribution of
intentionality in the Proposer’s unfair action, and not the action itself, that generates a
retaliatory response.  See, for example, Charness, supra note 77, and Blount, supra note
77, for discussions of “attribution.”
79 In another paper, I elaborate on this rationale for mandatory rules, dubbing this
form of argument—that a mandatory rule gives people what they would really want, if not
for the cost of deciding they want it—“excuse paternalism.”  Matthew J.B. Lawrence,
Forcing Patients To Do What They Really Want To Do:  The Case for Excuse Paternalism
(Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343539).
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to avoid appearing untrusting or unfair to their doctor.  One scholar,
for example, reports an interview with a woman who claimed to avoid
the subject of costs with her doctor for fear of being insulting or pro-
voking retaliation.80
A second example can be found in the puzzle surrounding
mandatory second opinions.  In another paper,81 I point out that
patients assume a fairness cost—the result of expressed distrust of
their doctors—in the decision to seek a second opinion that policy-
makers do not, which helps explain the mysterious success of
mandatory second opinion programs.82  The reasons proffered by
patients who do not obtain second opinions under a voluntary regime
suggest that (1) fairness costs indeed inhibit the decision to obtain a
second opinion,83 and (2) the fact that fairness costs are vitiated by
removing the element of choice explains why patients who do not
choose to obtain second opinions do not mind being forced to get
them.84
It is not surprising that patient decisionmaking is influenced by
the desire to appear fair.  As Mark Hall has shown, trust is an integral
part of the doctor-patient relationship.85  Patients want to trust their
doctors and, moreover, to appear trusting to their doctors.86  It is well
documented that “[p]atients want a therapeutic relationship with their
doctors, a relationship which produces and prospers on reliance,
attachment, and mutual confidence.”87  Thus, many, if not most,
patients are concerned with appearing to be “model,” trusting
patients—that is, they can be said to exhibit fairness-regarding
behavior of a type that depends on signaling.
80 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:  Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 655–56 (2008).
81 Lawrence, supra note 79.
82 More patients obtain second opinions under a mandatory regime than under a volun-
tary regime. See David A. Hyman, A Second Opinion on Second Opinions, 84 VA. L. REV.
1439, 1458 (1998) (“The most striking fact regarding all voluntary [surgical second opinion
programs] is that few people choose to use them.” (quoting Alan S. Friedlob, Medicare
Second Surgical Opinion Programs:  The Effect of Waiving Cost-Sharing, 4 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 99, 104 (1982))).  This success implies that many patients are made to
obtain second opinions who would not choose them otherwise and that surveyed patients
do not mind mandatory second opinion programs.  Stephen N. Rosenberg et al., Patients’
Reactions and Physician-Patient Communication in a Mandatory Surgical Second-Opinion
Program, 27 MED. CARE 466, 469–70 (1989).
83 Lawrence, supra note 79, at 19–22 (asserting that patients do not voluntarily seek
second opinions in part to avoid upsetting their doctors).
84 Id. at 22–23.
85 See generally Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002)
(discussing fundamental importance of trust to practice of medicine and to healthcare law).
86 Id. at 510.
87 Hall & Schneider, supra note 80, at 652.
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3. Fairness Costs in Malpractice
If, as discussed above, patients are fairness-regarding with their
medical providers, the question then becomes:  Would a patient, by
declining to sign an exculpatory agreement and thereby signaling a
lack of confidence in her doctor’s competence and a willingness to
sue, be departing from an ideal norm?88  Given that there are no
examples of a patient being presented with a nonadhesive exculpatory
agreement (those in reported cases are uniformly adhesive), the ques-
tion is difficult to answer empirically.
However, there is evidence that a fairness-regarding patient
would seek to avoid signaling distrustfulness of her doctor and a will-
ingness to sue.  First, it is no secret that malpractice suits are a sensi-
tive subject among doctors,89 and some doctors might even retaliate
against patients they view as litigious by refusing to treat them or by
practicing “defensive medicine.”90  Second, it is well documented that
doctors have psychological difficulties with the prospect of error,91
and it is quite plausible that patients are aware of this.  Third, studies
show that patients sue their doctors very rarely, even when they have
a valid cause of action.92  Moreover, the rate of malpractice suits
declines even further if doctors simply apologize to their patients after
making mistakes.93  Superior evidence of fairness-regarding behavior
in the real world would be difficult to find absent an empirical study.
Thus, it seems likely that for many patients, the signaling effect associ-
ated with refusing to sign an exculpatory agreement would impose a
88 This question derives from the definition of fairness presented in note 76 and accom-
panying text, supra.
89 See, e.g, David Hilfiker, Facing Our Mistakes, 310 N. ENG. J. MED. 118, 121–22
(1984) (“Even the word ‘malpractice’ carries the implication that one has done something
more than make a natural mistake; it connotes guilt and sinfulness. . . . [L]ittle wonder that
we are defensive about our judgments . . . .”).
90 Dorothy M. Allison, Comment, Physician Retaliation:  Can the Physician-Patient
Relationship Be Protected?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 965, 965, 967–68, 972 (1990).
91 See JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND MEDICAL NARCISSISM ix (2005) (dis-
cussing how error “might assault the professional’s sense of competency and adequacy”
and therefore be “psychologically intolerable” for doctors); Cherri Hobgood, Armando
Hevia & Paul Hinchey, Profiles in Patient Safety:  When an Error Occurs, 11 ACAD. EMER-
GENCY MED. 766, 768 (2004) (pointing out that “ideal of error-free practice . . . permeates
physician culture”). See generally INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:  BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000)
(presenting comprehensive study of errors in healthcare system).
92 See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE:  MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 140 (1993) (“[O]ur analysis of
malpractice litigation data demonstrates that the problem is not a litigation surplus, but a
litigation deficit.”).
93 See Kevin Sack, Doctors Start To Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Long Before ‘See You in Court,’
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1 (reporting that as result of doctors apologizing for med-
ical errors, “hospitals are reporting decreases in their caseloads and savings in legal costs”).
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significant cost.  For anyone concerned with appearing to be a trusting
or fair patient, the signaling effect associated with the decision to sign
an exculpatory agreement may be enough to render such a decision no
longer truly voluntary.  The next Part discusses how this problem may
have influenced the inconsistent New York doctrine.
III
SIGNALING PRESSURE AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY
AGREEMENTS DOCTRINE
In Part II, this Note identified a new reason courts might treat
medical malpractice exculpatory agreements as involuntary.  What
relevance does this new barrier to enforcement have to the doctrinal
confusion surrounding these agreements identified in Part I?  The
answer to this question depends on who is asking.  The easiest
response is made to the patient seeking to sue despite having signed a
medical malpractice exculpatory agreement:  She could use the sig-
naling-based argument to claim that her contract was involuntary and
hence unenforceable.
The existence of this potential new sword for plaintiffs suggests a
corollary response for the hypothetical defendant:  In order to have
his agreement enforced, he must eliminate the signaling pressures
associated with the patient’s decision to sign.  Part IV discusses ways
this may be accomplished, focusing on the use of a confidential con-
tract.  The harder question remains, however, as to whether the use of
a confidential agreement would in fact increase the chances of
enforcement.
A defendant could argue that the greater-responsibility strand of
the doctrine—which, as discussed in Part I.C., is the most likely source
of the categorical invalidation—might be motivated by signaling-
pressure concerns.  So understood, this doctrine would be entirely
inapplicable to certain confidential agreements that eliminate sig-
naling pressure associated with the decision to sign.
There are two arguments in favor of this understanding.  First, the
signaling-pressure explanation reconciles freedom-of-contract princi-
ples with the cases that seemingly apply a categorical rule, as I explain
below in Section A.  Second, this understanding can explain an excep-
tion to the void-for-public-policy test that is not easily justified
otherwise.
Two counterarguments are worth noting.  First, a natural objec-
tion is that a “new” theory cannot explain old doctrine.  But as I will
discuss in Section C, such an argument is not insurmountable:  “New”
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ideas may reshape the common law either because courts adopt them
in the face of ambiguity and confusion94 or because courts determine
the old cases were decided in accordance with an underlying prin-
ciple.95  Second, the argument in this Part that the signaling-pressure
explanation is an apt interpretation of the doctrine—and thus that a
confidential contract would have a fair shot at enforcement—is not
made to the exclusion of other contractual traits.  For instance, it is
true that many patients are not well informed96 about the contracts
they sign, thus presenting a separate and independent barrier to
enforcement.  The first generation of cases, in which exculpatory
agreements were invalidated for lack of clarity, made this clear.97
Therefore, an enforceable agreement must be worded such that it is
clear to the patient what exactly she is signing.  Additionally, Ash
makes clear that an agreement must be nonadhesive.98
A. Reconciling Treatment of the Categorical Rule with
Freedom-of-Contract Principles
Ash was ambiguous as to whether it created a categorical rule.  It
also departed from a long line of freedom-of-contract precedent that
focused on a case-by-case analysis.99  The ambiguity, however, can be
resolved by understanding the greater-responsibility justification as
being motivated by the signaling concern identified in the previous
Part.
This opportunity for doctrinal coherence might be the best argu-
ment in favor of confidential medical malpractice exculpatory agree-
ments:  If courts can reconcile the categorical approach with both
freedom-of-contract principles and the existing jurisprudence, they
should.  And, as I discuss in the next Part, if courts take signaling into
account, a confidential contract—which would not raise signaling con-
cerns—might be upheld.  It is possible that some patients faced with
94 See Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 791 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concur-
ring) (“The rationale for our decisions in which public policy defeats a pre-injury release
agreement has not always been particularly clear.”).
95 See generally ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW (2005)
(discussing this view of common law).
96 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, The Patient Life:  Can Consumers
Direct Health Care? 41–44 (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099054) (discussing limitations of patient
information and choice).
97 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing invalidation through strict
interpretation).
98 Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311–12 (App. Div. 1990).  For a
discussion of the adhesive considerations in the void-for-public-policy test, see notes 56–60
and accompanying text, supra.
99 See supra Part I.B.
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voluntary exculpatory agreements will sign for fear of offending their
provider, as shown in Part II.  But others might be unaffected by fair-
ness costs and choose to sign (or not to sign) based solely on their
uninhibited preferences.  Freedom-of-contract principles dictate that
without clear evidence in any given case that a contract was not signed
voluntarily, consensual agreements should be enforced.  At first
glance, then, the recognition of signaling pressures in some decisions
to waive malpractice might not justify a categorical rule such as the
one applied by some courts.100
But the case-by-case approach may not be capable of effectively
determining whether the decision to sign was influenced by signaling
pressures.  Unlike analyzing the language of an agreement or the
availability of alternatives, it is simply too difficult to know with cer-
tainty whether a given patient was worried about signaling distrust or
unfairness to her provider when she signed an agreement.101  Given
this fact, it is plausible that those New York courts applying a categor-
ical rule have simply intuited that enough decisions would be affected
by these signaling costs to justify categorical nonenforcement as a pro-
phylactic.  Thus, the categorical rule can be reconciled with the courts’
long line of freedom-of-contract precedent when understood as a pro-
phylactic test rather than a departure from its previous
jurisprudence.102
B. An Odd Exception
Further support for the signaling-pressure understanding is found
in an otherwise strange exception to the categorical rule.  According
to this exception, certain exculpatory agreements are enforceable if
they exculpate the doctor only for experimental, non-negligent treat-
100 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (showing void-for-public-policy test is
sometimes applied as categorical rule).
101 The difficulty of separating individuals who are boundedly rational—including those
who consider fairness costs—from those who are not is the motivating force behind the
discussion in Camerer et al., supra note 74.  Actually determining whether a given patient
only consented because of fear of hurting her doctor’s feelings would require assessing
whether the consideration the patient received—the reduction in price that accompanied
signing away negligence liability or punitive damages—was adequate.  But pricing the
“value” of malpractice liability or the availability of punitive damages is very difficult. See
supra note 1 (discussing widely varying results of malpractice suits).
102 It is worth emphasizing again that without nonadhesive exculpatory agreements to
study, it is not possible to determine precisely how many patients are actually affected by
fairness costs such as the signaling that accompanies the refusal to sign an exculpatory
agreement.  However, given the significant amount of circumstantial evidence presented in
Part II, some patients are surely affected.  If enforcing exculpatory agreements between
doctors and patients would lead to even a small minority of patients involuntarily waiving
the right to sue, protecting that minority might justify a categorical rule when a case-by-
case analysis is not possible.
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ment.103  Read literally, the categorical approach and the greater-
responsibility justification would seem to apply with equal force to
such a situation.
One possible explanation for this exception comes from under-
standing the greater-responsibility justification as being motivated by
signaling effects.  Much of what is signaled in the decision to sign a
medical malpractice exculpatory agreement is removed when the
agreement does not exculpate negligent treatment.  A patient who ref-
uses to sign and retains the right to sue for experimental, non-
negligent treatment does not signal anything about her perception of
the likelihood that her doctor will act negligently, but rather only sig-
nals that she is willing to accept the inherent risks of the experimental
treatment.  There is no reason to be concerned that a patient would
sign for fear of signaling this fact because any informed patient who is
unwilling to accept the risks of experimental treatment would simply
forego the surgery entirely.
C. Using New Ideas to Interpret Old Doctrine
One could argue that an existing confused doctrine cannot be
explained with a newly identified rationale.  This is not necessarily the
case.  If one views the common law as simply a series of judge-made
rules, the argument is not that the signaling-pressure explanation actu-
ally explains what the earlier cases were doing but rather that the sig-
naling-pressure explanation lends coherence to the law espoused in
past cases.104  If one views the common law as judges’ attempts to
apply the rules in accordance with some underlying principle in new
situations,105 then, given that the underlying principle in contract law
is freedom of contract, judges could have been intuiting the signaling-
pressure explanation when overturning agreements without articu-
lating precisely why those agreements violated freedom of contract.
In any event, I argue that a confidential agreement would give the
proponent a decidedly better chance of enforcement, even if it would
not necessarily guarantee a safe haven.
103 See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing proposition that
exculpatory agreement waiving suit for experimental treatment will be upheld in New York
courts as long as patient is fully informed).
104 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823,
839–40 (1972) (“There is a very strong presumption in most legal systems that . . . an
interpretation which makes a law conform to a principle is to be preferred. . . . This role of
principles is . . . a crucial device for ensuring coherence of purpose among various laws
bearing on the same subject.”).
105 See, e.g., Paul Craig, The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial Review, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 250 (2004) (using such analysis to explain development of
judicial review).
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IV
CRAFTING A CONFIDENTIAL CONTRACT
Whether the signaling pressure discussed in Part II only repre-
sents a new weapon in a medical malpractice plaintiff’s arsenal or also
provides a shield defendants could use to argue in favor of enforce-
ment, defendants seeking enforceable exculpatory agreements will
need methods of contracting that do not create problematic signaling
pressures.  This Part describes the ways in which this might be done,
introducing the idea of a “confidential contract,” in which the offeror
(the doctor) never finds out whether the offeree (the patient) accepts.
A confidential contract stands a better chance of enforcement—
all things being equal—than an agreement in which the doctor knows
the result of the patient’s decision to sign or not, as confidentiality
would help defeat attacks to agreements based on the greater-
responsibility justification for the categorical rule.  But first, any
doctor seeking to craft an ideal agreement that maximizes the
probability of enforcement must ensure that the recommendations of
the Private Malpractice Symposium are met:  The agreement must be
clearly worded and must specifically mention negligence.106  More-
over, the agreement must feature the two settled requirements previ-
ously discussed in order to avoid the clear pitfalls of Ash:  It must be
nonadhesive and it must not affect the quality of care given.107
Next, there are two ways to avoid signaling pressures—either (1)
contract for something that does not implicate signaling effects, or (2)
find a way to remove signaling effects from the contracting process.
The first option is relatively straightforward, and doctors and patients
arguably already have found ways to do so.  Arbitration agreements,
which are widely enforced, may be viewed as one way patients can
contract out of the malpractice system without signaling anything
about their perceptions of their doctors’ competence or their own will-
ingness to litigate.108  Agreements waiving non-negligent experimental
treatment may be another.109
But if the decision to sign does create a signaling effect—as an
agreement exculpating negligence will110—the agreement can still be
cured if the patient is assured that the doctor will never know whether
106 See supra note 27.
107 See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., LAW & POLAN, supra note 1, at 135 (describing such suggestion in arbitra-
tion context). But cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic
Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1436–43
(2008) (discussing sometimes-contested enforceability of arbitration agreements).
109 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110 See supra Part II.A.
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or not she signed the agreement.  This confidentiality would cure the
signaling effect associated with the decision to sign, avoid the greater-
responsibility problem, and thereby obviate the need for the accompa-
nying categorical approach.
Confidential contracting would not necessarily be difficult to
implement, especially given current institutional arrangements in the
medical services field.  There are two ways such a contract could be
completed.  First, an arrangement might utilize indirect contracting
between patients and managed care providers in a way that would not
signal to doctors which patients had signed agreements.111
Second, a doctor and patient could enter into a traditional con-
tract confidentially.  Contract law leaves plenty of room for such an
arrangement.  The doctor could present and explain both fee arrange-
ments—one including an exculpatory agreement, one not—as two
separate offers.  She could then invite the patient’s acceptance of
either offer confidentially, so as to remain in the dark about the
patient’s decision.  Such an arrangement would be perfectly legal:  the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes clear that the offeror may
invite acceptance by whatever reasonable means she designates in
making the offer, be it performance or, in this case, acceptance deliv-
ered to a third party.112  The Second Restatement also would not
require that the doctor be aware of the patient’s acceptance of the
contract offer.113  Of course, even if the contract were formed confi-
dentially, the patient may want a guarantee that her decision would
remain confidential.  Confidentiality and privacy clauses are common
elements of contracts, and, in this case, both offered contracts need
only include clauses that guarantee confidentiality, and perhaps pro-
vide some warranty in the event that confidentiality is breached.  In
addition, they might designate an independent third party—such as
someone in the doctor’s front office or the doctor’s malpractice insur-
ance company—to maintain the confidentiality of the agreement.
CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that previously unidentified signaling costs
may explain courts’ decisions regarding the enforceability of medical
111 Several policy arguments have been made in favor of contracting with managed care
organizations in this way.  Arlen, supra note 2, at 23–24.  This Note provides support for a
new argument in favor of these arrangements.
112 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 cmt. a (1981) (“Offers commonly
invite acceptance in any reasonable manner . . . .”).
113 Indeed, § 54 of the Second Restatement actually specifies that “no notification is
necessary to make . . . an acceptance effective unless the offer requests such notification.”
Id. § 54.
June 2009] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS 879
malpractice exculpatory agreements.  If a court could be convinced
that the greater-responsibility justification is driven by the signaling-
pressure explanation, I argue that a tool that removes the signaling
pressure may allow courts to uphold the contracts, and that a confi-
dential medical malpractice exculpatory agreement that is also
nonadhesive and clearly worded would likely be enforceable.
This Note has focused on signaling effects and confidential con-
tracting in the context of medical malpractice exculpatory agreements,
but these ideas might be generalized to other situations, especially
where a “special relationship” between the two parties poses
problems for the enforceability of nonadhesive, clearly worded con-
tracts.  For example, contracts in the workplace have been invalidated
under the special-relationship prong of the void-for-public-policy
rationale.114  Further research might usefully explore whether confi-
dential contracts may be used in this way or, indeed, to cure any con-
tract rendered problematic by signaling pressures.
114 White v. Village of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616, 619–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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